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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are law professors with an interest in patent
law and patent administrative procedure.1 They have
an interest in the proper interpretation and applica
tion of patent law statutes. The statutory interpreta
tion adopted by the Federal Circuit in the opinion
below is inconsistent with the statutory text and the
canon of consistent usage. Therefore, amici believe this
Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold that
statutory estoppel applies only to grounds that were
raised or reasonably could have been raised during the
inter partes review proceeding. A list of amici appears
in Appendix A.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and
hold that estoppel following inter partes review (IPR)
extends only to grounds that a party “raised or reason
ably could have raised during that inter partes review,”
with “during that inter partes review” meaning the
time period between institution and final decision, as
1

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, counsel for amici rep
resent that this brief was authored solely by amici and their coun
sel. No part of this brief was authored by the parties or their
counsel, and no person other than amici or their counsel made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief. Affiliations are provided for identification purposes; this
brief does not purport to present the institutional views, if any, of
their employers. Counsel for petitioners and respondent received
timely notice of amici’s intent to file and have consented to the
filing of this brief.
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indicated by the statutory text. Specifically, the statute
delineates the process of deciding whether to “insti
tute” review from the “proceeding” where the Board
will “conduct” the “review.” The statute notes the date
“on which the review shall commence” and says that
the “length of review” is the “time between the institu
tion . . . and . . . final written decision.”
A broad reading of the estoppel provision also
raises questions of procedural fairness in light of the
Board’s practices. By regulation, the Patent Office im
poses strict page limits on petitions, such that petition
ers cannot raise all potential grounds for invalidity.
Then, in future proceedings, the petitioner might face
a billion-dollar infringement verdict on a patent where
legitimate grounds for invalidity are barred from con
sideration despite never being decided before. A broad
reading also complicates future proceedings by requir
ing a determination of what prior art a petitioner
should have known about at the time of its petition.
This is an important issue; innovation markets cannot
function efficiently with uncertainty on whether a
party facing a patent infringement lawsuit is barred
from defending against it on grounds of invalidity of
the patent.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------

3
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DURATION OF REVIEW IS THE TIME
FROM INSTITUTION TO DECISION

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)2 es
tablished a procedural framework for new forms of
adversarial challenges to issued patents before the Pa
tent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), including inter
partes review (IPR).3 In an IPR, the Board may review
the validity of a patent based on lack of novelty or ob
viousness. 35 U.S.C. § 311. The type of prior art that
may be raised in an IPR is limited to patents or printed
publications. Id. Before an IPR can “commence,” 35
U.S.C. § 314(c), the Director considers a petition for re
view and any response and thereafter will “determine
whether to institute an inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(b). The Director delegated the IPR institution de
cision to the Board by regulation. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)
(2020).
“The statute separates the Director’s decision to
‘institute’ the review, § 314, on one hand, from the
Board’s ‘conduct’ of the review ‘instituted’ by the Direc
tor, § 316(c). . . .” St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v.
Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Any person (other than the patent owner) may file a
petition seeking institution of inter partes review of a
2

Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
3
The goals of the AIA included “improving patent quality
and providing a more efficient system for challenging” patents.
See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40, 46–48, 54.
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patent. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). However, under current Pa
tent Office procedure, a petition for review is subject to
strict page limitations, including a 14,000-word limit,
which may limit the total number of grounds for inva
lidity and depth of analysis that a petitioner can in
clude in a petition for IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2020).
The Director may institute review if and only if she de
termines that the petitioner is reasonably likely to pre
vail on at least one challenged patent claim. 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(a).
If the Director determines that institution is ap
propriate, the Patent Office will issue a Notice of Insti
tution, which “shall indicate the date on which the
review shall commence.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(c). If the Di
rector denies institution, no IPR proceeding will occur.
After the IPR commences, the Board will “conduct” the
IPR proceeding, following procedures set forth by stat
ute, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316, and procedures set by regula
tion, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2020). The proceeding
concludes when the Board issues a final written deci
sion. 35 U.S.C. § 317. In the statute, the term “Length
of Review” is used to mean “the length of time between
the institution of, and the issuance of a final written
decision.” 35 U.S.C. § 317(d).
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II.

“DURING THAT INTER PARTES REVIEW”
MEANS DURING THE PROCEEDING
A. Estoppel Applies Narrowly to Insti
tuted Grounds in Light of Textual
Meaning and Statutory Context

The AIA provided that, after the Board issues a fi
nal written decision as to the validity of a patent claim
in an IPR, the petitioner or the party bringing the chal
lenge, or its privy, is estopped from asserting in any
later USPTO proceeding, civil litigation, or section 337
investigation before the International Trade Commis
sion (ITC) that the patent claim is invalid “on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(e)(2). The core interpretive question is whether
“raised or reasonably could have been raised during
that . . . review” refers to grounds that could have been
raised in the petition, or only grounds that could have
been raised once the proceeding was instituted. If the
“review” begins only after institution, then grounds not
raised in the petition or not subject to institution will
not be subject to estoppel because they were not raised
“during that . . . review.” However, if the “review” be
gins with the petition, then estoppel will apply to any
grounds that the petitioner raised or could have raised
in its petition for review.
The AIA’s statutory framework provides critical
context to answer this interpretive question. “[T]he
normal rule of statutory interpretation [is] that identi
cal words used in different parts of the same statute
are generally presumed to have the same meaning.”
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IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005). The statute
delineates the duration of review as the time period
between the institution of review and the Board’s final
written decision. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316, 317(d). Specifically,
the statute defines the “length of review” as “the length
of time between the institution of, and the issuance of
a final written decision.” 35 U.S.C. § 317(d). And it also
states that the review shall “commence” on the date
stated in the Notice of Institution. 35 U.S.C. § 314(c).
Read according to its plain terms, the statutory term
“review” therefore means the period between the insti
tution of review and the final written decision. “[W]hen
the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the
courts—at least where the disposition required by the
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its
terms.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (in
ternal quotation omitted). Under this narrow reading
of the estoppel provision, a petitioner would only be
barred from raising grounds in a later litigation which
were instituted in proceedings before the Patent Office.
Christa J. Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statu
tory, Historical, and Normative Analysis, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 1127 (2018).
B. If Congress Intended to Refer to the Pe
tition, It Knew How to Do So
If Congress had intended the estoppel provision to
apply to grounds that “were raised or reasonably could
have been raised in the petition for review,” it knew
how to do so. Several other provisions in the statute
refer to the “petition” and its contents: Section 311
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describes a “petition to institute an inter partes re
view.” 35 U.S.C. § 311. In Section 314, the statute states
that the Director shall consider “the information pre
sented in the petition filed under section 311” when de
ciding whether to institute an inter partes review. 35
U.S.C. § 314(a). Elsewhere in the statute, Congress re
peatedly used the word “petition” when referring to the
petition for review. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 312. An argument
that Congress intended a provision to be read differ
ently than the plain meaning of the text is particularly
unpersuasive where obvious alternative language like
this is available to convey the alternate reading but
was not used. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,
1356 (2018) (“[I]f Congress wanted to adopt the Direc
tor’s approach it knew exactly how to do so.”).
C. “Could Have Raised” Is Not Superfluous
Because Petitioners Might Not Raise In
stituted Grounds During the Proceeding
Some might caution that a reading of “during that
inter partes review” that is limited to the duration of
the review proceeding renders the phrase “reasonably
could have raised” superfluous. However, this argu
ment ignores the strategic and procedural realities of
practice before the PTAB. There are many instances
where a petitioner could raise a ground during the pro
ceeding, because it was one of the grounds on which
the patent office instituted review, but nonetheless
might choose not to do so. For example, a petitioner
might simply choose, for strategic reasons or because
of limitations on space or time, to focus on certain

8
grounds for unpatentability during the course of the
review, such as if the institution decision provides in
sight on which grounds are most likely to succeed be
fore the Board. Laser, 70 FLA. L. REV. at 1144. Indeed,
in the pending case, the parties filed a joint motion to
limit the scope of the review to only certain grounds.
Apple Inc. v. California Inst. of Tech., IPR2017-00219,
Paper 72 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2018). Because the peti
tioner chose not to litigate other instituted grounds
during the proceeding, it would be estopped from rais
ing those grounds again in a later proceeding, provided
that the review resulted in a final written decision.
Moreover, if the estoppel provision is read broadly
in order to accommodate a reading of the word “raised”
to mean “raised in the petition,” then either the word
“during” would have an even more unusual reading
that includes “not during,” or the phrase “inter partes
review” would carry a different meaning than used
throughout the rest of the statute, i.e., the time period
between institution and final written decision. “Raised,”
within the context of this provision, could alternatively
mean when the petitioner presents its arguments at
the hearing before the PTAB. Because “during” and
“inter partes review” can have no other broader mean
ing, but “raised” could ordinarily refer to issues pre
sented to the PTAB for consideration during the
review, any apparent conflict between these meanings
should be resolved in favor of conserving the ordinary
meaning of the term “during” and the statutory mean
ing of the term “inter partes review.”
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III. A BROAD READING OF ESTOPPEL POSES
RISKS
A. Procedural Fairness Concerns
Petitioners cannot raise all potential grounds that
they might have to render a patent claim invalid in a
petition for inter partes review. PTAB procedural rules
substantially limit the contents of a petition: under
current rules, petitions for IPR are limited to 14,000
words. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2020). Particularly if a patent
has hundreds of pieces of prior art that anticipate the
patent or render it obvious, petitioners are frequently
unable to include and adequately explain all possible
grounds for unpatentability in a petition of only 14,000
words. The Patent Office’s procedures effectively limit
the number of grounds a petitioner may include in a
petition for review. This differs from court proceedings,
where parties may include all possible grounds for in
validity in their pleadings, subject only to the limits
of Rule 11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Although petitioners
could spread the grounds across multiple petitions,
the PTO then might be more likely to issue a discre
tionary denial of all the petitions. See Greg Reilly, Pa
tent Office Power & Discretionary Denials (August 11,
2022), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4188185.
B. Effects on Other Statutory Provisions
If the Court were to read the IPR estoppel provi
sion broadly such that “raised or reasonably could
have raised during that inter partes review” means
“raised or reasonably could have raised in a petition
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for inter partes review,” then the Court would have to
do the same throughout the statute. The AIA also cre
ated other post-grant proceedings, including Post-Grant
Review (PGR). A petition for PGR may challenge pa
tentability on any ground that may serve as an in
validity defense under § 282, including obviousness,
novelty, indefiniteness, and patentable subject matter,
with no limitations on the type of prior art that may be
raised. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b). The estoppel provision appli
cable to PGR is substantially identical to that applica
ble in IPR: the petitioner or the party bringing the
challenge, or its privy, is estopped from asserting in
any later USPTO proceeding, civil litigation, or section
337 investigation before the International Trade Com
mission (ITC) that the patent claim is invalid “on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised during that post-grant review.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 325(e). Applying broad estoppel to PGR would have
even more severe effects on litigation because it would
bar all defenses on invalidity grounds, not just those
for lack of novelty and obviousness.
IV. THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL IS IM
PORTANT AND NEEDS URGENT CLARI
FICATION
A. Confusion on the Scope of IPR Estoppel
Before the Federal Circuit’s opinion below, district
courts were hotly divided on the topic of the scope of
IPR estoppel. Laser, 70 FLA. L. REV. at 1162-64; Cali
fornia Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., 25 F.4th 976, 990
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(Fed. Cir. 2022) (collecting cases). Moreover, district
courts that adopted a broad interpretation of estoppel
then had to assess what prior art a petitioner could
have raised in the petition, using varying tests like
whether a “skilled searcher” could reasonably uncover
the prior art from a “diligent search.” Laser, 70 FLA. L.
REV. at 1163. The Federal Circuit is the only appellate
court that decides patent issues, leaving no room for a
circuit split. However, there is disagreement among
prior Federal Circuit panels and judges as to the scope
of IPR estoppel and disagreement on how to interpret
this Court’s precedent in SAS Institute. Compare Cal
ifornia Inst., 25 F.4th at 991 with Laser, 70 FLA. L. REV.
at 1159-61 (citing, e.g., HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC,
817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Without resolu
tion by this Court, confusion as to the scope of estoppel
and how to apply it will continue.
B. Clarification of Estoppel Is Important
Because Billion-Dollar Infringement
Verdicts Can Rise and Fall on Its Scope
The more anticipated a claim is by extensive prior
art, the more likely, under the Federal Circuit’s inter
pretation, that potentially successful grounds for
challenging the patent will never be heard by any tri
bunal. With the Federal Circuit’s approach to estoppel,
a billion-dollar patent infringement verdict can stand
on a patent that might have been found invalid if
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challenged, but the parties were prevented from rais
ing it. This has dramatic effects on business interests.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and
hold that IPR estoppel extends only to grounds that
were raised or could have been raised during the IPR
proceeding. Estoppel would therefore extend to insti
tuted grounds, whether raised during the proceeding
or not. Estoppel would not extend to uninstituted
grounds, such as grounds which might have been chal
lenged in the petition for review but were not.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTA LASER
Counsel of Record
Assistant Professor of Law
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW
2121 Euclid Avenue, LB163
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
Telephone: 216-687-2529
Facsimile: 216-687-6881
c.j.laser@csuohio.edu
Counsel for Amici Curiae
Dated: October 6, 2022
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